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paper ends with some concluding thoughts on next steps.
THE CLIMATE CHANGE-SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: SYNERGY AND TRADE-OFFS
It is widely recognized that there are linkages between climate change and sustainable development. Policy in both areas has converged over the past years in terms of both content and approach (Beg et al., 2003; Eriksen & O"Brien, 2007; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007; Swart et al., 2003) . Since sustainable development can be understood as "attempts to combine concerns with the environment and socio-economic issues" (Hopwood, Mellor & O"Brien, 2005, p. 40) , the linkages with climate change are obvious.In a developing country context, this issue combines environmental concerns with social equity and the economic issue of poverty. Accordingly, climate change is related to a large number of other environmental and socio-economic issues, which include biodiversity, deforestation, rural electrification, desertification, resource availability (e.g. water), income generation capacity, security, and health. Regarding these linkages, there can be a negative interaction between climate change and sustainable development. For example, climate change causes severe droughts, leading to increased shortage of water resources, which in turn might intensify conflicts and security problems in developing countries Swart et al., 2003) . From a policy perspective, there is also potential for a positive interaction. While developing countries tend to be more vulnerable to climate change -their economies often depend on agriculture, which is highly susceptible to weather conditions, and they lack the means to cope with variable and quickly changing weather conditions -raising the level of development may reduce this vulnerability (Eriksen and O"Brien, 2007; Tol, 2005) . It is not surprising, then, that calls have been made to deal with both issues simultaneously and arrive at an integrated policy (Beg et al., 2003; Swart et al., 2003) .
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Although there might be important synergies in addressing climate change and sustainable development simultaneously, there is no guarantee that these synergies will indeed materialize in all cases (Eriksen & O"Brien, 2007) . There might even be trade-offs between the two issues (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007) . One source of trade-offs in the climate change-sustainable development nexus is that advocates of one issue will tend to see the other issue as a way of furthering their own main goals. To illustrate, the launch of the Millennium Development Goals at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg has been an important force for further integrating environmental issues like climate change in the development debate (Klein et al., 2005; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007) . This process, which has been referred to as "mainstreaming", means that climate change becomes an integral part of development policy Klein et al., 2005) .The risk of mainstreaming is that it will redirect funds to projects that might see an optimal overlap between both issues, but do not have the highest potential impact on either the development issue at stake, such as poverty reduction or universal primary education (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007) or the climate change issue, such as mitigation or adaptation (Klein et al., 2005) .
Likewise, in climate change negotiations, the term "development dividend" has been employed to refer to climate policies that have clear development benefits (Forsyth, 2007) .
The development dividend has been debated mainly in the context of the Clean Development Mechanism 2 (CDM). Here, trade-offs have emerged as well. The goal of the CDM is achieving emissions reductions in developing countries, while enhancing technology transfer from industrialized to developing countries and contributing to sustainable development (Lecocq & Ambrosi, 2007; Streck, 2004) . However, the CDM works as a market mechanism and participants have predominantly focused on achieving efficiency gains and capturing economic value from reducing emissions. As a consequence, the main outcome of the CDM
has been projects that involve low-cost emissions reductions rather than sustainable development benefits, due to the fact that contributions to sustainable development were not valued the same as emissions reductions which created additional tradable credits (Olsen, 2007; Sterk&Wittneben, 2006) . Furthermore, most CDM projects have so far taken place in emerging economies with stronger institutions, such as China and India, where the risk that CDM credit delivery would fail were deemed lower than in much poorer developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Lecocq & Ambrosi, 2007; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007) .
Hence, questions can be raised whether the integration of the climate change and sustainable development agendas is indeed a fruitful one. Moreover, the climate changesustainable development nexus takes on a different meaning when a clear distinction is made between climate change mitigation and adaptation (Burton et al., 2002; Klein, Schipper & Desai, 2005) ; an important divide that has come to the fore in climate policy over the past decade, particularly in a developing-country context. countries, the low level of development and lack of funds also makes adaptation more challenging (Beg, et al., 2002; IPCC, 2007; Shalizi & Lecocq, 2010; Swart et al., 2003; Tol, 2005) .
Although mitigation and adaptation are two distinctive policy options for climate change, both are linked to sustainable development, but in different ways. Mitigation and adaptation are markedly different because their impact refers to different temporal and spatial scales as well as involve different actors in the process of policy formulation and implementation (Klein et al., 2005) . Their distinctiveness has consequences for how they are linked to sustainable development, and particularly for the types of issues within the broad realm of sustainable development.
The effect of mitigation will only be noticeable in the long run, but it operates on a global scale. As a result, a broad range of public and private actors from industrialized and increasingly also developing countries feel a responsibility for, and are involved in, mitigation (Klein et al., 2005) . What is more, as a result of the CDM, actors from industrialized countries have a financial incentive to invest in mitigation options in developing countries, such as avoiding deforestation, transferring energy-efficient technologies and investing in renewables (Beg et al., 2003) . The potential development impact of mitigation is therefore linked to issues such as biodiversity, deforestation, and rural electrification.
In contrast, the effect of adaptationessentially operates on a local level. Adaptation is a local collective good that relates to, inter alia, land use, agriculture, urban planning, water supply, coastal vulnerability, desertification, health and ecosystem integrity. It is the local nature of these development issues that causes difficulties in engaging actors from industrialized countries, because the responsibility to take action is not that apparent (Klein et al., 2005; Swart et al., 2005) . By contrast, business interest in adaptation has only begun recently as companies are now realizing that they will have to build capacity to effectively respond to extreme weather events (Linnenluecke, Griffiths & Winn, 2011; Winn, Kirchgeorg, Griffiths, Linnenluecke&Günther, 2011) . Nevertheless, it has been argued that the role of business is pivotal: not only are companies affected by the physical impacts of climate change, but this is also where most adaptation activities will (have to) take place or originate from (Berkhout, Hertin & Gann, 2006) .One reason why the uptake of adaptation as a corporate response to climate change has been limited so far is that there is no common definition of what adaptation means for business, and both theory and empirical evidence in this area are very limited (Nitkin, Foster & Medalye, 2009 ). The usual policy definition of adjusting to physical impacts is not yet the main way in which the concept is being understood and/or adopted in companies (Kolk, Pinkse & Hull, 2010; Nitkin et al, 2009 , 2011; Sussman & Freed, 2008) .
In the remainder of the paper we will descriptively explore multi-stakeholder partnerships for climate change in developing countries.We will distinguish between adaptation and mitigation by examining how both policy approaches are being targeted by partnerships, a phenomenon that we will explain more generally first.
THE ROLE OF PARTNERSHIPS
One of the more recent definitions of partnerships is "collaborative arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical process, and through which these actors strive for a sustainability goal" (Van Huijstee et al., 2007, p. 77 ). The notion is older though; by the 1990s, partnerships were conceptualized more broadly as "the voluntary collaborative efforts of actors from organizations in two or more economic sectors in a forum in which they cooperatively attempt to solve a problem or issue of mutual concern that is in some way identified with a public policy agenda item" (Waddock, 1999, pp. 481-482) . Both definitions highlight the fact that partnerships cut across sectors and involve non-hierarchical processes, which means that partnerships are based on the idea of shared responsibility (Mazurkiewicz, 2005) in which no single actor -for example, the government -regulates behaviour of other actors; instead cooperation is required as one actor cannot solve it alone (Selsky &Parker, 2005; Witte et al., 2003) .Another notable characteristic of a partnershipis the aim of providing a collective good and thelink to a publicpolicy objective such as climate change and/or development (Schäferhoff, Campe & Kaan, 2009; Waddock, 1991 Selsky & Parker, 2005 , for an overview).
Cooperation with NGOs has become part and parcel of approaches adopted by governments and international organizations, and also been studied for their role in sustainable development (Vargas, 2002) . Partnerships between NGOs and companies have received attention in the management literature, where they are frequently designated social alliances (as parallel to strategic alliances amongst companies) (Austin, 2000b; Berger, Cunningham, & Drumwright, 2004; Rondinelli & London, 2003) . There has also been interest in collaboration between public and private parties, as an innovative instrument for an international organization (Samii, Van Wassenhove, & Bhattacharya, 2002) or in a broader development context targeted at a product/technology public-private partnership, for example (Chataway & Smith, 2006) . The final form, and the one on which this paper focuses, involves multi-stakeholder partnerships, frequently seen as the best way to deal with multifaceted problems in the current epoch (Austin, 2000a; Selsky & Parker, 2005) . Such complex issues, including the ones dealt with in this paper, seem to require cooperation across sectors (and countries) with involvement of all partners as they share a common goal of resolving them.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships have the potential to address a number of gaps in the development context. Within the governance literature multi-stakeholder partnerships are mainly seen as sources for new global rulesetting involving non-state actors where "old" public governance is falling short and regulatory gapsneed to be filled (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Dahan, Doh & Teegen, 2010) . They aim to address different forms of "governance" failure in a situation where governments, companies and NGOs are unable to unilaterally achieve desired public objectives, especially when it comes to complex meta-
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stakeholder partnerships for development have demonstrated a clear division of roles between the partners: companies bring specific knowledge and expertise; NGOs provide local embeddedness and contacts, and supporting activities such as training and capacity building;
and governments supply funding, usually to reduce risks, and facilitate the activities (Kolk, Van Tulder & Kostwinder, 2008) .
However, besides learning from each other, partnerships "can also create new knowledge that neither of the collaborators previously possessed" (Hardy et al., 2003, p. 325) .
In other words, a fourth role of multi-stakeholder partnerships is overcoming a learning gap: Addressing the four gaps -regulatory, participation, resource and learning -is likely to be more complex in developing countries than it already is in industrialized countries.
Moreover, although it has been widely argued that the involvement of companies is key as they bring in resources, knowledge and expertise (London & Rondinelli, 2003; Selsky & Parker, 2005) , company involvement may be inhibited in a developing-country setting.
Context does matter, especially given the institutional setting and the degree to which an institutional void is present (Reficco&Márquez, 2009) . Partnerships that are implemented in (and thus need to be designed for) developing countries need to reckon with the frequent absence of "good governance", and the presence of a larger variety of "failures" than can be found in industrialized countries (Kolk, Van Tulder & Kostwinder, 2008) . For (business)
partners from industrialized countries, the activities take place in a distant and uncertain local context, with often different socio-cultural, political and economic peculiarities. This requires a greater degree of trust or understanding of the specific backgrounds of each partner, and perceptions and expectations may diverge as well, and need to be taken into account.It is therefore vital that we understand how multi-stakeholder partnerships are structured so as to address synergies and trade-offs in the climate change -sustainable development context.
EXPLORING MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In this section we descriptively explore how both climate policy approaches -mitigation and adaptation -are being targeted by multi-stakeholder partnerships in developing countries.
The complexity of dealing with climate change in a developing-country setting, characterized by regulatory, participation, resource, and learning gaps, has raised expectations as to the contribution of multi-stakeholder partnerships as a form of governance which can harness the strengths of different parties (Andonova et al., 2009; Forsyth, 2007) . Insight into how a multistakeholder setting might help address climate policy in developing countries has been limited, and represents an emerging and novel field. This complicates assessments, as it is unclear to what extent existing frameworks can be applied. Therefore, we followed a largely descriptive approach to map developments in this nascent field and look at a few illustrative multi-stakeholder partnerships for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries that have emerged in recent years.
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To this end, we first performed an extensive web search, analysed responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project 3 and carried out a literature review to identify a broad set of climate change partnerships in 2007 (for more details, see Kolk, Pinkse & Hull, 2010 Tables 1, 2 and 3) . We start with mitigation as this has received most hal-00707337, version 1 -18 Jun 2012 attention over the years, then move to partnerships oriented towards adaptation, and end with partnerships that seem to be "hybrids" somewhere in between mitigation and adaptation.
=================
Insert Tables 1, 2 & 3 ==================
Partnerships for mitigation in developing countries
The mitigation partnerships that we found tend to be linked to the global carbon market(either the regulatory or voluntary carbon market), which creates a financial incentive for participation. This is mostly attributable to the fact that the Clean Development Mechanism has emerged as the main instrument for addressing climate mitigation activities in developing countries (Newell et al., 2009 It therefore aims to establish supportive policies and regulations for renewables and energy efficiency, and to remove market and institutional barriers. Moreover, REEEP tries to create "business and finance solutions" to overcome financial barriers and lack of investments in such technologies, particularly in developing countries. The partnership leverages funding from CDM and advocates using the CDM Gold Standard 4 to implement the projects (REEEP, 2009 ).
REEEP has been characterized as "public governance of private finance" (Newell et al., 2009) , as national governments from OECD countries (most notably the UK and Norway)
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are dominant stakeholders providing most of the funding (REEEP, 2009). Nevertheless, REEEP has a broad representation of stakeholders including governments, business, NGOs, international organizations and academia. The governance structure enhances the inclusiveness of local stakeholders and decision-making is a bottom-up process (REEEP, 2009 ). Yet, the projects that REEEP undertakes mainly reflect the goal of transforming markets by removing regulatory and financial obstacles, while the goals of climate mitigation and poverty alleviation are considered secondary goals at best (Pattberg, Szulecki, Chan &Mert, 2008) . In other words, REEEP particularly aims at using public funds to stimulate business participation in the investment of renewables and energy efficiency. In addition, while the more than 100 projects have a global coverage, priority seems to lie in large emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil, as it is here that market transformation has the highest potential. Still, REEEP seems quite successful in achieving the goals it set itself and has grown to an unprecedented size, being much larger than other partnerships in this area (Pattberg et al., 2008) . for Sustainable Transport EMBARQ, which has already successfully implemented sustainable transport solutions in several cities, also by forming multi-stakeholder partnerships. SloCat can be seen as a "nested partnership", made up of other entities sometimes also organized as partnership. We identified a number of other nested partnerships, including the Energy Poverty Action partnership mentioned above,and Energy for All, which has the REEEP and WBCSD as member.
Partnerships for adaptation in developing countries
We found fewer multi-stakeholder partnerships with corporate involvement aimed at adaptation. This is not that surprising given that adaptation has only become an integral part take on many different meanings (Nitkin et al., 2009) , and as we mentioned above, there are no clear financial incentives for most businesses to engage (Klein et al., 2005) . Nevertheless, a quick overview of the limited number of adaptation partnerships that we identified shows that they are unequivocally linked to poverty issues, thus reflecting the view that adaptation is as much a development as an environmental issue (Eriksen & O"Brien, 2007) .
Multi-stakeholder partnerships for adaptation can be divided into three types, concentrating on different dimensions of building resilience to climate change: (1) physical and institutional infrastructure investments (e.g. coastal protection, flood defense and disaster relief), (2) insurance schemes, and (3) research and development (e.g. health and agricultural research) (Fankhauser et al., 2008 
Creating mitigation-adaptation linkages in partnerships
The examples of mitigation partnerships presented above all entail mitigation by reducing energy-related emissions such as providing access to renewable energy, energy efficiency and sustainable transport solutions. Recently, however, the debate on mitigation through land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) has received a new impetus, when efforts to reduce emissions from tropical deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) were included in the 2007 Bali Action Plan. Emissions from land use change make up a significant portion of global emissions and REDD is considered a way of including developing countries in a postKyoto framework (Evidente, Logan-Hines & Goers, 2009) . It is here that the linkages between climate change and sustainable development are most apparent, because land use and forestry are linked to issues such as biodiversity and desertification (Swart et al., 2003) , and could have an impact on the adaptive capacity of developing countries (Fankhauser et al., hal-00707337, version 1 -18 Jun 2012 partnerships that appear to create linkages between mitigation and adaptation.
For years, the debate on carbon sequestration from afforestation and reforestation and specifically avoided deforestation has been a contentious one (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006; Boyd, Corbera& Estrada, 2008) . While national governments were allowed to use carbon "sinks" to comply with the Kyoto targets, the inclusion in CDM has taken much Climate Action Project was a pioneer project that tested and refined the science of forest carbon accounting and monitoring" and that "projects like these are critical stepping stones that can help inform development of national-level programs and build up the capacity and expertise that countries will need to protect their forests on a national scale" (Hoekstra, 2009 ).
The contested nature of forestry projects do challenge whether "maximizing synergies"
between climate change and sustainable development goals is realistic, as many trade-offs are observable (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006) .
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our descriptive exploration of multi-stakeholder partnerships for climate change in developing countries shows that the number of initiatives is still fairly limited. Most focus on mitigation, targeting aspects such as rural electrification, sustainable transport and transfer of best practices in energy efficiency. Some mitigation projects in the area of carbon sequestration through afforestation, reforestation and avoided deforestation also benefit adaptation, although not always explicitly. Identifying climate adaptation partnerships in which companies were involved was much more difficult. This seems to be just emerging as part of the overall shift in policy attention towards adaptation.The financial incentives for corporate engagement in adaptation appear to be very limited, in contrast to mitigation where a clear linkage to the global carbon market can be seen.
In addition to the adaptation-mitigation dimension, we can also consider the governance function ( Table 1 ).What must be noted though is that the boundaries between them are not always clearly delineated, and partnerships often have more than one function at the same time.
The climate mitigation partnerships that we found showed a considerable diversity across all three governance functions -information sharing, capacity building and implementation, and rulesetting -thus reflecting policy formulation and implementation functions to realize energy efficiency, renewable energy, transport and carbon sequestration hal-00707337, version 1 -18 Jun 2012
and deforestation projects in developing countries. For example, while the largest partnership, REEEP, combines the rule-setting and implementation functions, SloCat has so far mainly focused on advocacy to put low-carbon transportation for developing countries on the political agenda. As to the emerging adaptation partnerships, the ones that we identified have been predominantly targeted towards information sharing as both the ACCCRN and MCII partnerships aim for knowledge diffusion to develop novel strategies and products. This is not surprising given the fact that adaptation has been lagging behind as a policy and business issue (Nitkin et al., 2009) , but implementation appears to be a likely next stage if these partnerships proceed. Finally, the forestry mitigation partnerships that benefit adaptation as well -BioCarbon Fund and NKCAP -have been mostly oriented towards capacity building and implementation, although some have also been used as showcases to some extent, to illustrate how forestry can be included in global agreements and carbon markets, and may be seen to have some advocacy components in that way.
Regarding the involvement of different types of actors, there seems no clear relation between main (initiating or operating) actor and governance function. Nevertheless, we could discern various roles for companies. In most partnerships, corporate involvement seems rather passive, that is to say, companies can be found in the list of members, but looking at specific projects (non)governmental partners are more highly involved. Nevertheless, in some partnerships companies do seem to play a key role. Corporate involvement can be best understood when the function of a partnership is viewed in terms of the gap it is attempting to fill, i.e. regulatory, participation, resource or learning gap. Not surprisingly, in those partnerships that aim for filling a regulatory gap -REEEP, SloCat& MCII -on the whole companies have a relatively passive role; rule setting is still more in the domain of governmental actors (see Table 2 ). In these "regulatory gap-filling" partnerships, the specific purpose of the companies involved is more geared towards providing specialized knowledge hal-00707337, version 1 -18 Jun 2012
(e.g. Munich RE in MCII) or performing a knowledge brokerage function (e.g.
GesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammenarbeitin SloCat).
More generally, as the management literature on partnerships affirms (Hardy et al., 2003; Rondinelli & London, 2003; Selsky & Parker, 2005) , companies" main role in partnerships is directed towards resource and learning gaps, that is, providing financial resources (e.g. REEEP; BioCarbon Fund; NKCAP), skills (e.g. EPA), or specialized knowledge (e.g. ACCCRN, MCII). Nevertheless, the corporate input into a process of collaborative learning was fairly modest. Although the identified partnerships were not of a philanthropic nature, most were transactional, not integrative (Austin, 2000b) . For example, companies funding forestry projects through NKCAP or the BioCarbon Fund gained carbon credits in exchange, while companies engaged in REEEP could profit from the removal of market barriers and publicity (Pattberg et al., 2009) . Corporate involvement for the sake of filling a participation gap is largely absent in all partnerships except for the EPA.The companies involved in the partnerships we identified are relatively large companies from industrialized countries. There is hardly any inclusion of local companies in developing countries, as most local partners are local governments and NGOs.
Most partnerships, even the ones initiated by corporate actors, operate within the framework of a separate organizational entity managing the partnership, e.g. the United
Nations (e.g. MCII), World Bank (e.g. BioCarbon Fund) or a specifically set up non-profit organization (e.g. EPA) or secretariat (e.g. REEEP). This has been referred to in the literature as "referent organizations" (Trist, 1983) , which are established to "regulate activity around
[an] issue, and to mobilize resources andaction to address it", and[…] "are often structuredas nonprofit organizations" (Selsky, 1998, p. 284) . Partnerships are often placed under the umbrella of existing organizational entities or ones specifically set up for the purpose, and such referent organizations enable companies to decouple their engagement in the public hal-00707337, version 1 -18 Jun 2012
domain from their for-profit activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) .
Finally, a closer look at the multi-stakeholder partnerships explored in this paper indicates that the complexities and trade-offs in creating linkages between climate change and sustainable development as well as mitigation and adaptation are more apparent than the potential synergies. All partnerships intend to create linkages between climate change and other sustainable development issues (see Table 3 ). For example, the mitigation partnerships particularly intend to combine climate change with poverty alleviation in the form of improving access to electricity in remote locations (e.g. REEEP and EPA) or transport policies in urban areas (e.g. SloCat). In adaptation partnerships, on the other hand, the fact that they mainly have an information sharing function implies that the synergy is predominantly sought in combining different sources of knowledge to create resilience strategies (e.g. ACCCRN) or insurance products (e.g. MCII). The hybrid partnerships, with their focus on forestry projects, more specifically aim at combining climate change with biodiversity and benefits for local communities. However, many multi-stakeholder partnerships with high corporate participation do not only try to create synergies on an issue level, but our illustrative cases seem to suggest that another important goal is to tap new markets, either for renewable energy and energy efficiency (e.g. REEEP and EPA), insurance (e.g. MCII) or the carbon market (BioCarbon Fund and NKCAP). As a consequence, these partnerships face potential trade-offs between maximizing market potential and creating issue linkages, the latter of which may be regarded as secondary co-benefits only. How this works out at the level of specific companies beyond the realm of broad referent organizations deserves in-depth investigation.
Our cases suggest that some issues are included in the mission of a multi-stakeholder partnership retrospectively. For example, there is the impression that adaptation benefits of forestry projects have only started to get noticed quite recently, when the global policy debate hal-00707337, version 1 -18 Jun 2012 started moving in this direction. There seems to be tension between the stated objectives and the activities carried out as part of the partnership. REEEP is a case in point; although it has a broad objective including implementation, information sharing and rule setting, in practice the main activity carried out is knowledge dissemination (Pattberg et al., 2009 ). There are clear trade-offs between different governance functions: it is unclear whether some partnerships that currently focuson formulating policy will be able to move to the next phase of implementing these policies. For genuine adaptation partnerships, such as ACCCRN and MCII, the biggest challenge may be to attract attention from corporate actors. It is therefore somewhat doubtful whether these partnerships will be able to move beyond the formulation phase and carry on into the implementation phase, if this requires much higher levels of (start-up) funding.
Obviously our cases have been very exploratory, reflecting the nascent nature of multi-stakeholder partnerships in this context, with all the limitations that are part and parcel of such an approach. Since we relied on secondary data, our implications need to be taken with much caution and are of a highly preliminary nature. Nevertheless, we think that the climate change-sustainable development nexus is topical and highly relevant and deserves further attention when it evolves. It seems inevitable that the climate change and sustainable development debates are increasingly considered as strongly overlapping fields and there is great promise in finding synergies between both. In addition, business involvement also has the potential to aid in addressing regulatory, participation, resource and learning gaps as well as development and climate problems simultaneously. Multi-stakeholderpartnerships could be an important conduit in achieving this.However, there seem to be a considerable number of trade-offs in dealing with climate change and sustainable development simultaneously.
Companies involved in the partnerships might not always look for furthering the official mission of a partnership but focus more on maximizing market potential of developing hal-00707337, version 1 -18 Jun 2012 countries instead. Therefore, while looking for synergies seems warranted, there will also be cases where it appears more fruitful that each issue will be dealt with separately.
The extent to which multi-stakeholder partnerships will be able to address all four identified gaps, and thus contribute to true sustainable development, is difficult to assess at this stage. Future management research should focus on mitigation within the climate change-sustainable development nexus as it is in this context that corporate interests may merge best with those of public and nonprofit partners (see for example REEEP"s focus on improving access to electricity in remote areas). The current stalemate in the climate negotiations also means that those areas where most activities can be found are likely to be in fairly "straightforward" projects on energy efficiency, renewable energy and -particularly relevant for developing countries -(rural) electrification. While the more visible global partnerships that we examined in this paper often also aimed to link up with CDM funding, this is much less the case for smaller-scale initiatives. This means that we could learn from (renewable) energy-related partnerships without being hampered that much by the difficulties at the intergovernmental level. Interest in realizing progress "on the ground" may even belarger because of frustration about climate policy development post-Copenhagen.
The extent to which the provision of funding (e.g. by corporate partners, international organizations, or industrialized donor countries) also shapes the type of participation and inclusiveness of partnerships deserves further attention. This also applies to a more finegrained examination of adaptation and mitigation partnerships, by focusing not just on the more general "global" (or industry) initiatives, but also the more specific ones implemented by companies in developing countries together with governmental and non-governmental partners. These may be less dependent on the existence of an encompassing global framework, and a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, as they might be seen as means to develop new markets, combine strategic and corporate social responsibility strategies, or tap funding 
